Neurocognitive Models of Schizophrenia: A Neurophenomenological CritiqueGallagher S.
Department of Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences Program, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Fla., USA
This paper argues that Frith’s (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms.
Department of Philosophy, Colbourn Hall 411
University of Central Florida
Orlando, FL 32816-1352 (USA)
Tel. +1 407 823 5409, Fax +1 407 823 6658, E-Mail firstname.lastname@example.org
Received: December 19, 2002
Accepted after revision: December 4, 2003
Published online: February 24, 2004
Number of Print Pages : 12
Number of Figures : 1, Number of Tables : 0, Number of References : 52
Psychopathology (International Journal of Descriptive and Experimental Psychopathology, Phenomenology and Psychiatric Diagnosis)
Founded 1897 as ‘Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie’
Official Journal of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA), Section of Clinical Psychopathology and Section of Classification and Diagnostic Assessment
Vol. 37, No. 1, Year 2004 (Cover Date: January-February 2004)
Journal Editor: C. Mundt, Heidelberg; E. Gabriel, Vienna; J.E. Mezzich, New York, N.Y.
ISSN: 0254–4962 (print), 1423–033X (Online)
For additional information: http://www.karger.com/psp