In historical and epistemological terms, psychiatry is a new discipline born during the 19th century. Rooted in both the natural and social sciences, psychiatric objects of inquiry, namely mental symptoms and mental disorders, are hybrid, constituted by the blending of components arising from disparate sources of knowledge ranging from the biological to the semantic in its widest sense. This poses problems for psychiatric research and therapy. Whilst conventional pluralism may be a convenient approach to manage aspects of psychiatric practice, it lacks the capacity to analyse psychiatric objects in their entirety. For the latter, psychiatry demands a new, tailored regional epistemology. This paper outlines the main features of an epistemology specific to the needs of psychiatry. It highlights the relational approach that needs to be taken and illustrates the usefulness of this approach by analysing the structure of psychiatric objects, exploring the manner in which they may be inscribed in the brain, and identifying the need to periodically recalibrate the language of psychiatry.

Keywords:
Epistemology, Psychiatry, Philosophy, Mental symptoms, Brain localisation
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